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Abstract. From .. to .., the Dagstuhl Seminar 07021 Symmetric Cryp-
tography was held in the International Conference and Research Center
(IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several participants pre-
sented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were
discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well
as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper.
The ﬁrst section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links
to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.
Keywords. Authenticity, Integrity, Privacy, Block Ciphers, Stream Ci-
phers, Hash Functions, Provable Security, Cryptanalysis
07021 Executive Summary  Symmetric Cryptography
The Seminar brought together about 35 researchers from industry and academia.
Most of the participants came from diﬀerent European countries, but quite a few
also came from America and Asia. Almost all the participants gave a presenta-
tion. Most of them gave a "regular" talk of 30 to 50 minutes (including discussion
time), some gave a "rump session" talk, and a few even gave two presentations,
a regular one and another at the rump session.
Keywords: Authenticity, Integrity, Privacy, Block Ciphers, Stream Ciphers,
Hash Functions, Provable Security, Cryptanalysis
Joint work of: Biham, Eli; Handschuh, Helena; Lucks, Stefan; Rijmen, Vincent
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1020
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Seven-Property-Preserving Iterated Hashing: The RMC
Construction
Elena Andreeva (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, B)
Nearly all modern hash functions are constructed by iterating a compression
function.
These compression functions are assumed to be secure relative to some se-
curity notion, like collision resistance, and we say the notion is preserved by
the construction if the iterated hash is also secure relative to the notion. At
FSE04, Rogaway and Shrimpton [RS04] formalized seven security notions for
hash functions: collision resistance (Coll), three variants of second-preimage re-
sistance (Sec, aSec, eSec), and three variants of preimage resistance (Pre, aPre,
ePre). In this paper determine, by proof or counterexample, which of these seven
notions is preserved by existing iterated constructions. It turns out that none of
strengthened Merkle-Damgard, Preﬁx-free Merkle- Damgard, Enveloped Merkle-
Damgard Linear Hash, XOR-Linear Hash, Shoup's Hash, Randomized Hash, or
HAIFA preserves all seven notions. In particular, all fail to preserve (at least)
aSec and aPre. We propose a new iterated hash function, the Randomized Mask-
then- Compress (RMC) construction, and prove that it is the ﬁrst to preserve
all of the notions. It does this using a salt, and a small random oracle that is
called only a logarithmic number of times in the number of message blocks.
Keywords: Cryptographic hash functions, Merkle-Damgard hash, collision re-
sistance, preimage resistance, second-preimage resistance, provable security
See also: [RS04] Phillip Rogaway and Thomas Shrimpton. Cryptographic hash-
function basics: Deﬁnitions, implications, and separations for preimage resis-
tance, second-preimage resistance, and collision resistance. In Bimal K. Roy and
Willi Meier, editors, Fast Software Encryption 2004, volume 3017 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 371-388. Springer- Verlag, Berlin, Germany,
2004.
Concealed data aggregation in wireless sensor networks
Frederik Armknecht (NEC Europe - Heidelberg, D)
Reducing the total required energy in a wireless sensor network is an outstanding
goal. As sending one bit requires the same amount of energy as executing 50 to
150 instructions on sensor nodes, reducing the network traﬃc as much as possible
is a substantial task. A widely discussed approach is the in-network aggregation
of the sensed data.
Another serious issue is the security of the data. Considered that the data
is transmitted encrypted, there is the problem of making aggregation possible
without giving to much knowledge to the usually non-tamper resistant nodes. An
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approach that promises the combination of end-to-end security and in-network
aggregation is the concealed data aggregation (CDA).
The talk gives an overview on the topic of CDA, discusses some existing
solutions, and points out open problems.
Block Ciphers and Stream Ciphers and the Creatures in
Between
Alex Biryukov (University of Luxembourg, L)
In this paper we deﬁne a notion of leak extraction from a block cipher. We
demonstrate this new concept on an example of AES. A result is LEX: a simple
AES-based stream cipher which is at least 2.5 times faster than AES both in
software and in hardware.
Keywords: Stream ciphers, block ciphers
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1038
Algebraic Attacks On Block Ciphers
Nicolas T. Courtois (University College London, GB)
In this talk I will present some recent results concerning algebraic attacks on
block ciphers.
Keywords: Algebraic cryptanalysis, block ciphers, DES, AES
How Fast ca be Algebraic Attacks on Block Ciphers?
Nicolas T. Courtois (University College London, GB)
In my talk I did overwiev the area of algebraic attacks on block ciphers, explain
what fast algebraic attacks on block cipher are, and what results can already be
achieved. This covers a vast amount of work (several papers, most of them not
published) that I cannot include here in totality due to the lack of space.
Keywords: Algebraic Attacks On Block Ciphers, XSL attacks, AES, DES, SAT
Solvers, T' method, Gröbner bases
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1013
Sponge functions
Joan Daemen (STMicroelectronics - Zaventem, B)
Ideally, cryptographic hash function should not be easier to attack than random
oracles. Most practical cryptographic hash functions are iterated and exhibit
internal collisions.
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These internal collisions are a weakness that random oracles do not have
and can be used in several attack scenario's. Examples are multicollision at-
tacks [Joux], 2nd-preimage attacks [Kelsey Schneier] and herding attacks [Kelsey,
Kohno].
We propose an alternative for the random oracle in this context: a random
sponge. A sponge is a simple construction that implements a variable-length
input, inﬁnite length output function making use of a permutation. In some
sense, a random sponge is the closest to a random oracle with an iterated function
operating on a ﬁnite state: we prove that in the absence of inner collisions the
output has exactly the same distribution as a random oracle. On the other hand,
by increasing the capacity, a parameter that models the size of the internal state,
the generation of internal collisions can be made arbitrarily diﬃcult.
Random sponges may serve as reference for what a concrete hash function
should satisfy: designers may specify that their hash function is considered to
be broken when there is an attack that is more successful than for a random
sponge with given capacity. The sponge structure also give inspiration for design
leading to cleaner constructions.
Keywords: Cryptographic hash functions
Joint work of: Daemen, Joan; Bertoni Guido, Peeters Michaël; Van Assche,
Gilles
Finding SHA-1 Characteristics
Christophe De Cannière (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, B)
In this talk, we will present techniques for constructing SHA-1 characteristics.
We will discuss how these characteristics look like in general, develop metrics
to evaluate them, and propose strategies to search for characteristics optimizing
these metrics.
Joint work of: De Canniere, Christophe; Rechberger, Christian
Keyless Postprocessing of Pseudorandom Bit Sequences, a
Good Means to Increase their Cryptographic Strength?
Markus Dichtl (Siemens - München, D)
I will look at several known methods of keyless postprocessing for pseudorandom
bit sequences. Some turn out to work well, some not. I will also suggest a new
method and will discuss some of its properties.
Keywords: Streamcipher, pseudorandom, postprocessing
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Cryptographic Shuing of Random and Pseudorandom
Sequences
Markus Dichtl (Siemens - München, D)
This papers studies methods to improve the cryptographic quality of random or
pseudorandom sequences by modifying the order of the original sequence. A new
algorithm Cryshu is suggested, which produces its shued output data at the
rate of the input data.
Keywords: Shuing stream-cipher
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1014
A Uniﬁed Approach to Related-Key Attacks
Orr Dunkelman (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, B)
In this talk we introduce a new framework and a generalization of the various
ﬂavors of related-key attacks. The new framework allows for combining all the
previous related-key attacks into a complex, but much more powerful attack. The
new attack is independent of the number of rounds of the cipher. This property
holds even when the round functions of the cipher use diﬀerent subkeys.
The new attack can be applied to a wide variety of ciphers, including ciphers
that were previously considered immune to related-key attacks.
The strength of our new method is demonstrated by an attack on 4r-round
IDEA, for any r. This attack is the ﬁrst attack on a widely deployed block cipher
which is independent of the number of rounds.
The variant of the attack with r = 2 is the ﬁrst known attack on 8-round
IDEA.
Keywords: Related-Key Attacks, IDEA, Slide Attack
Joint work of: Dunkelman, Orr; Biham, Eli; Keller, Nathan
QUAD: overview and recent developments
Henri Gilbert (France Telecom - Issy Les Moulineaux, F)
In this talk I will ﬁrst give an outline of the main features of the QUAD stream
cipher initially proposed at Eurocrypt '06, and an overview of the reduction of
the security of the keystream generation to the intractability of solving a random
system of 2n equations in n unknowns over GF(2).
I will also describe some more recent developments related to QUAD:
- Hardware and software performance: it will be shown that if one is willing
to pseudorandomly generate the systems of quadratic polynomials underlying
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QUAD, then this leads to a suprisingly inexpensive hardware implementation
(only 3500 g.e. for some parameter choices).
- Finally, an extension of the initial security argument to incorporate the IV
loading.
Keywords: Stream ciphers, quadratic equations, provable security, multivariate
cryptography
Joint work of: Gilbert, Henri; Arditti, David, Berbain, Côme; Billet, Olivier;
Patarin, Jacques
QUAD: Overview and Recent Developments
Henri Gilbert (France Telecom - Issy Les Moulineaux, F)
We give an outline of the speciﬁcation and provable security features of the
QUAD stream cipher proposed at Eurocrypt 2006.
The cipher relies on the iteration of a multivariate system of quadratic equa-
tions over a ﬁnite ﬁeld, typically GF(2) or a small extension. In the binary case,
the security of the keystream generation can be related, in the concrete security
model, to the conjectured intractability of the MQ problem of solving a random
system of m equations in n unknowns. We show that this security reduction can
be extended to incorporate the key and IV setup and provide a security argu-
ment related to the whole stream cipher.We also brieﬂy address software and
hardware performance issues and show that if one is willing to pseudorandomly
generate the systems of quadratic polynomials underlying the cipher, this leads
to suprisingly inexpensive hardware implementations of QUAD.
Keywords: MQ problem, stream cipher, provable security, Gröbner basis
Joint work of: Arditti, David; Berbain, Côme; Billet, Olivier; Gilbert, Henri;
Patarin, Jacques
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1015
Block ciphers to encrypt unusual domains
Louis Granboulan (EADS-Suresnes, F)
While usual block ciphers are pseudo-random permutations of the set of 64-bit or
128-bit strings, it might be useful to have block ciphers that permute arbitrary
sets. Here we consider designs of such block ciphers, and we avoid using usual
block ciphers as building blocks. We describe directions for three types of unusual
domains: blocks being numbers in base p 6= 2; sets of small size, typically 232;
set of points of an elliptic curve.
Keywords: Block cipher
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Blind Diﬀerential Cryptanalysis for Enhanced Power
Attacks
Helena Handschuh (Spansion - Levallois-Perret, F)
At FSE 2003 and 2004, Akkar and Goubin presented several masking methods to
protect iterated block ciphers such as DES against Diﬀerential Power Analysis
and higher-order variations thereof. The underlying idea is to randomize the
ﬁrst few and last few rounds of the cipher with independent masks at each round
until all intermediate values depend on a large number of secret key bits, thereby
disabling power attacks on subsequent inner rounds. We show how to combine
diﬀerential cryptanalysis applied to the ﬁrst few rounds of the cipher with power
attacks to extract the secret key from intermediate unmasked (unknown) values,
even when these already depend on all secret key bits. We thus invalidate the
widely believed claim that it is suﬃcient to protect the outer rounds of an iterated
block cipher against side-channel attacks.
Keywords: Diﬀerential cryptanalysis, power analysis, side channel attacks
Joint work of: Handschuh, Helena; Preneel, Bart
See also: To appear in the proceedings of Selected Areas in Cryptography,
Montreal, August 2006
Tightness of the Security Bound of CENC
Tetsu Iwata (Nagoya University, J)
This talk presents an overview of recently developed encryption mode for block-
ciphers, called CENC.
CENC has the following advantages:
1. beyond the birthday bound security,
2. security proofs with the standard PRP assumption,
3. highly eﬃcient,
4. single blockcipher key,
5. fully parallelizable,
6. allows precomputation of keystream, and
7. allows random access.
Then we discuss the tightness of its security bound, and give a partial answer
to the open problem posed at FSE 2006.
Keywords: Encryption mode, blockcipher, CENC, provable security
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1016
Full Paper:
http://www.nuee.nagoya-u.ac.jp/labs/tiwata/
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On the computation of diﬀerential characteristics for
arbitrary S-Boxes
Antoine Joux (University of Versailles, F)
In this talk, we revisit the Walsh transform and its well-known application to
the computation of linear characteristics. We show that it can also be used
to compute diﬀerential characteristics. After that, we present a generalization
that very eﬃciently address the problem of computing truncated diﬀerential
characteristics.
On Boolean Functions with Maximal Algebraic Immunity
Matthias Krause (Universität Mannheim, D)
We construct boolean functions f from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}m for which the graph
gr(f) = {(x, f(x));x ∈ {0, 1}n} has maximal algebraic immunity. This research
is motivated by making building blocks of symmetric cryptosystems immune
against algebraic attacks. we completely solve the problem of constructing single-
output boolean functions for which the graph has maximal algebraic immunity.
Concerning multi-output functions we present an eﬃcient algorithm, based on
matroid union, which computes for given n,m, d the table of function with n
input and m output bits for which the immunity of the graph is at least d. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst systematic method for constructing
multioutput functions of high immunity.
Keywords: Algebraic immunity, boolean functions
Joint work of: Krause, Matthias; Armknecht, Frederik
On Block Cipher Based Hash Functions
Stefan Lucks (Universität Mannheim, D)
This talk presents a new construction for 2n-bit hash functions, based on an
n-bit block cipher with 2n-bit keys. The hash function runs at rate one and is
proven collision-resistant in the ideal cipher model. Further, this talk discusses
block cipher based hash functions in general, and the usage of the ideal cipher
model for proving hash function security.
A Collision-Resistant Rate-1 Double-Block-Length Hash
Function
Stefan Lucks (Universität Mannheim, D)
This paper proposes a construction for collision resistant 2n-bit hash functions,
based on n-bit block ciphers with 2n-bit keys.
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The construction is analysed in the ideal cipher model; for n = 128 an ad-
versary would need roughly 2122 units of time to ﬁnd a collision.
The construction employs combinatorial hashing as an underlying build-
ing block (like Universal Hashing for cryptographic message authentication by
Wegman and Carter).
The construction runs at rate 1, thus improving on a similar rate 1/2 ap-
proach by Hirose (FSE 2006).
Keywords: Hash function, provable security, double-block-length
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1017
Algebraic Immunity of S-boxes and Augmented Functions
Willi Meier (FH Nordwestschweiz - Brugg, CH)
The algebraic immunity of S-boxes and augmented functions of stream ciphers is
investigated. Augmented functions are shown to have some algebraic properties
that are not covered by previous measures of immunity. As a result, eﬃcient
algebraic attacks with very low data complexity on certain ﬁlter generators be-
come possible. This has been experimentally tested. Our investigation allows to
contribute to open problems in the context of algebraic attacks using Gröbner
bases against ﬁlter generators: Why in certain cases such attacks are successful
even for a very short known output segment.
In a similar line, the algebraic immunity of the augmented function of the
eSTREAM candidate Trivium is experimentally tested. These tests suggest that
Trivium has some immunity against algebraic attacks on augmented functions.
Such experiments become feasible as for Trivium with its 288-bit state one can
ﬁnd preimages of 144-bit outputs in polynomial time.
Augmented functions of LFSR-based stream ciphers have previously been
studied. It had been noticed that the augmented function can be weaker than a
single output function, with regard to (conditional) correlation attacks as well as
to inversion attacks. However, for the ﬁrst time, we analyse the algebraic immu-
nity of (sometimes quite large!) augmented functions. Surprisingly, augmented
functions did not receive much attention in this context yet.
Joint work of: Meier, Willi; Fischer, Simon
Update on Tiger
Florian Mendel (TU Graz, A)
Tiger is a cryptographic hash function with a 192-bit hash value which was
proposed by Anderson and Biham in 1996. At FSE 2006, Kelsey and Lucks
presented a collision attack on Tiger reduced to 16 (out of 24) rounds with
complexity of about 244.
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Furthermore, they showed that a pseudo-near-collision can be found for a
variant of Tiger with 20 rounds with complexity of about 248.
In this article, we show how their attack method can be extended to con-
struct a collision in the Tiger hash function reduced to 19 rounds. We present
two diﬀerent attack strategies for constructing collisions in Tiger-19 with com-
plexity of about 262 and 269. Furthermore, we present a pseudo-near-collision for
a variant of Tiger with 22 rounds with complexity of about 244.
Keywords: Cryptanalysis, hash functions, diﬀerential attack, collision, near-
collision, pseudo-collision, pseudo-near-collision
Joint work of: Mendel, Florian; Rijmen, Vincent; Preneel, Bart; Yoshida, Hi-
rotaka; Watanabe, Dai
See also: Florian Mendel, Bart Preneel, Vincent Rijmen, Hirotaka Yoshida, and
Dai Watanabe, Update on Tiger. In Proceedings of Progress in Cryptology - IN-
DOCRYPT 2006, 7th International Conference on Cryptology in India, Kolkata,
India, December 11-13, 2006, pp. 63-79, LNCS 4329.
Technical Aspects of PLAYSTATION 3
Shiho Moriai (Sony - Tokyo, J)
This talk will give technical aspects of PLAYSTATION 3, which was launched in
November 2006 in Japan and US. It is currently scheduled it is launched in March
2007 in Europe. The talk includes the Cell Broadband Engine, Blu-ray Disc,
network connectivity, SIXAXIS wireless controller, high-deﬁnition capabilities,
HDD, system interoperability and backwards compatibility.
A Key-Recovery Attack on SOBER-128
Kaisa Nyberg (Helsinki University of Technology, FIN)
In this talk we consider linear approximations of layered cipher constructions
with secret key-dependent constants that are inserted between layers, and where
the layers have strong interdependency. Then clearly, averaging over the constant
would clearly be wrong as it will break the interdependencies, and the Piling Up
-lemma cannot be used. We show how to use linear approximations to divide the
constants into constant classes, not necessary determined by a linear relation.
As an example, a nonlinear ﬁlter generator SOBER-128 is considered and we
show how to extend Matsui's Algorithm I in this case. Also the possibility of
using multiple linear approximations simultaneously is considered.
Keywords: Linear approximations, correlation, linear cryptanalysis, key recov-
ery attack, piling-up lemma, SOBER-128
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Joint work of: Nyberg, Kaisa; Risto, Hakala
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1018
Structural Analysis of SMASH
Norbert Pramstaller (TU Graz, A)
At FSE 2005, Knudsen proposed a new hash function design strategy called
SMASH. In this talk we present a detailed structural analysis of the design
strategy. First, we show how one can construct collisions for SMASH by ex-
ploiting structural properties of the hash function. Secondly, we generalize the
collision attack resulting in second preimages for SMASH.
Joint work of: Lamberger, Mario; Pramstaller, Norbert; Rechberger, Christian;
Rijmen, Vincent
Cryptanalysis of eSTREAM Phase 2 ciphers
Bart Preneel (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, B)
We present eﬃcient key recovery attacks on several eSTREAM Phase 2 stream
ciphers. These include ABC (v2 and v3), Py (also PyPy and P6) and Phelix.
Our attacks use weak keys and diﬀerential cryptanalysis with related or chosen
IVs. They have in common that they require less than 240 words of key stream
and that they recover (part of) the key with a complexity of less than 240.
Keywords: Stream ciphers, diﬀerential cryptanalysis, weak keys, related IV
Joint work of: Preneel, Bart; Wu, Hongjun
Finding Generalized Characteristics: Applications and
Open Problems
Christian Rechberger (TU Graz, A)
As a follow-up of the talk "Finding SHA-1 Characteristics", we will discuss
applications of generalized characteristics, and open problems in this context.
Joint work of: De Canniere, Christophe; Rechberger, Christian
Plateau characteristics
Vincent Rijmen (TU Graz, A)
Plateau characteristics are a special type of characteristics whose probability
depends on the key and can have only 2 values.
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For a (usually small) subset of the keys it has a non-zero probability and for
all other keys its probability is zero. We show that for a large group of ciphers,
including the AES, all two-round characteristics are plateau characteristics. For
the AES and other ciphers with a similar structure, the vast majority of char-
acteristics over 4 or more rounds are plateau characteristics. In the case of the
AES, for most keys there are two-round characteristics with ﬁxed-key proba-
bility equal to 32/2−32 while the Maximum Expected Diﬀerential Probability
(MEDP) of two-round diﬀerentials is at most 13.25/2−32.
Keywords: Diﬀerential cryptanalysis, AES
Joint work of: Rijmen, Vincent; Daemen, Joan
Formalizing Human Ignorance: Collision-Resistant
Hashing without the Keys
Phillip Rogaway (Univ. of California - Davis, USA)
There is a rarely mentioned foundational problem involving collision-resistant
hash-functions: common constructions are keyless, but formal deﬁnitions are
keyed. The discrepancy stems from the fact that a function H : 0, 1∗− > 0, 1n
always admits an eﬃcient collision-ﬁnding algorithm, it's just that us human
beings might be unable to write the program down.
We explain a simple way to sidestep this diﬃculty that avoids having to key
our hash functions. The idea is to state theorems in a way that prescribes an
explicitly-given reduction, normally a black-box one. We illustrate this approach
using well-known examples involving digital signatures, pseudorandom functions,
and the Merkle-Damgard construction.
Full Paper:
http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/∼rogaway/papers/ignorance.pdf
Design and Primitive Speciﬁcation for Shannon
Gregory G. Rose (Qualcomm Inc. - San Diego, USA)
Shannon is a synchronous stream cipher with message authentication function-
ality, designed according to the ECrypt NoE call for stream cipher primitives,
proﬁle 1A (but well after the call).
Shannon is named in memory of Claude E. Shannon of Bell Labs and MIT,
founder of Information Theory. Shannon is an entirely new design, inﬂuenced
by members of the SOBER family of stream ciphers, Helix, Trivium, Scream,
and SHA-256. It consists of a single 32-bit wide, 16 element nonlinear feedback
shift register, which is supplemented for message authentication with 32 parallel
CRC-16 registers.
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Keywords: Stream cipher
Joint work of: Rose, Gregory G.; Hawkes, Philip; Paddon, Michael; McDonald,
Cameron; Wiggers de Vries, Miriam
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1019
BDD-Attacks on Stream Ciphers
Dirk Stegemann (Universität Mannheim, D)
Stream ciphers are primarily used for online-encryption of arbitrarily long data,
for example when transmitting speech data between a Bluetooth headset and a
mobile phone. Many practically used and intensively discussed stream ciphers
consist of a small number of linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) that trans-
form a secret key x ∈ {0, 1}n into an output keystream of arbitrary length. In
2002, Krause showed how to use Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) to mount a
generic attack on this type of ciphers that recovers the secret key from the short-
est information-theoretically possible amount of output keystream. In the case of
the Bluetooth cipher E0, this attack is the best currently known short-keystream
attack. Unlike correlation attacks and algebraic attacks, the BDD-attack is also
applicable to irregularly clocked stream ciphers like the GSM cipher A5/1. In
this talk, we describe the BDD-attack and its application to A5/1 and E0 in
theory and practice, show how to reduce its memory consumption, and sketch
some recent developments.
Keywords: Stream cipher, LFSR, E0, A5/1, BDD-attack
When Stream Cipher Analysis Meets Public-Key
Cryptography
Serge Vaudenay (EPFL - Lausanne, CH)
We present a new public-key cryptosystem, a hardware-oriented public-key cryp-
tosystem, whose security relies on the hardness of problem coming from stream
cipher analysis: the problem of ﬁnding a low-weight multiple of a given polyno-
mial. Our improvement makes it possible to decrypt in polynomial time (instead
of exponential time) and to directly prove semantic security (instead of one-
wayness). We further build IND-CCA secure schemes using the KEM/DEM and
Fujisaki-Okamoto hybrid encryption frameworks in the random oracle model.
This can encrypt an arbitrary message with an overhead of about 5 Kb in less
than 15 ms, on an ASIC of about 10,000 gates at 4 MHz.
Keywords: Low-weight multiple, public-key cryptosystem, stream cipher analy-
sis
Joint work of: Aumasson, Jean-Philippe; Finiasz, Matthieu; Meier, Willi; Vau-
denay, Serge
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How cryptography interacts with legal safeguards
Marion Videau (LORIA - Nancy, F)
The research topic that is presented here has no strong relations with symmetric
cryptography and is more intended to consist in some kind of rump session talk.
It deals with what has always been a border of cryptography, that is to
say law. The very aspect underlined here concerns electronic writing and the
keeping of evidence. We take the example of the French law which had claimed
the equivalence between handwritten signature and digital signature in 2001.
We present some consequences of this choice regarding the problem of evidence
creation and keeping as for contracts.
It highlights the fact that adapting to digital environment is not straight-
forward from law point of view, but also that cryptographic tools may not be
adapted to law requirements at all.
Keywords: Cryptography, law, record management, digital signature
Recovering S-Boxes by solving polynomial equations
Ralph-Philipp Weinmann (TU Darmstadt, D)
For licensing reasons, DRM schemes may want to implement ciphers with secret
S-Boxes. For example, the block cipher C2 of the CPRM scheme has a secret
8-bit S-Box.
In a chosen-text, chosen-key model, we investigate how this speciﬁc S-Box
could be recovered using a combination of a diﬀerential attack and solving poly-
nomial equations. From the carefully chosen plaintext/ciphertext pairs we obtain
suﬃcient information to expect a unique solution for a large polynomial system
over GF(2); yielding a number of entries of the secret S-Box.
Keywords: Block ciphers, secret s-boxes, polynomial systems, algebraic crypt-
analysis
Joint work of: Weinmann, Ralph-Philipp; Kuehn, Ulrich
Data-at-Rest Encryption: Issues and Standards
Doug Whiting (Hifn - Carlsbad, USA)
This presentation outlines the current standards activities in IEEE P1619 deal-
ing with encryption of data at the physical block level (not the ﬁle level) on disk
and tape. There is no universal agreement (yet) on all the threat models to be
addressed, and these standards are not intended for data interchange. Rather
severe constraints are imposed on the cryptography here due to backward com-
patibility requirements.
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This talk will discuss some of the best understood threats addressed by the
proposed standards, as well as the open issues and concerns.
Keywords: Data-at-Rest Storage Encryption
Why IV Setup for Stream Ciphers is Diﬃcult
Erik Zenner (Cryptico - Copenhagen, DK)
In recent years, a large number of stream ciphers have been broken due to prob-
lems with their IV setup. When taking an engineering approach to designing a
good IV setup (as opposed to a trial-and-error approach), we have to start by
asking what such an IV setup is supposed to achieve.
As it turns out, all questions related to this issue are essentially unanswered.
In this talk, we give an overview over these open questions.
Keywords: Initialization vectors, IV setup, stream cipher
Why IV Setup for Stream Ciphers is Diﬃcult
Erik Zenner (Cryptico - Copenhagen, DK)
In recent years, the initialization vector (IV) setup has proven to be the most
vulnerable point when designing secure stream ciphers. In this paper, we take a
look at possible reasons why this is the case, identifying numerous open research
problems in cryptography.
Keywords: Stream cipher, IV setup
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1012
